Governance Under Fire: Prospects for Reforming Resistance Governance in Burma

By: Billy Ford

October 15, 2025

Resistance Governance in a Protracted War

The conflict in Burma has hardened into a protracted war. After capturing more than 90 towns in 2023 and 2024, the resistance missed an opportunity in mid-2024 to apply escalatory pressure on the junta and genuinely test the limits of its institutional resilience. With full Chinese backing, the junta has rebounded with a wave of offensives marked by widespread atrocities. These operations appear designed to drive out resistance forces and uproot civilians, clearing the way for the junta to stage sham elections with minimal disruption. Its ongoing clearance operations rank among the worst election violence the world has seen in years.

Despite a sweeping campaign of airstrikes and atrocities, the junta has recaptured just nine towns under its latest offensive while the resistance has captured three towns during the same period. It is uncertain whether the junta’s costly offensive will produce enduring territorial gains or prove sustainable after the election, but the regime has achieved a measure of stability. That likely means the conflict will persist.

Given the protracted nature of the war, it is increasingly important that the resistance builds stronger institutions that enable it to fight effectively, address survival needs of the public, achieve a viable political roadmap, and apply pressure on the junta. This raises important questions about the capacity and integrity of local governance. Critics – often with good reason – describe these emerging structures as fragmented, ineffective, and occasionally abusive. While such characterizations hold true in some regions, they do not tell the whole story.

The junta’s campaign of aerial bombardment and sustained violence is designed to destabilize civilian life, making it extraordinarily difficult to build and maintain functional governance. Even the most principled and capable administrations would struggle to operate under such relentless assault.

The criticisms of resistance governance and major ongoing changes within the governance system raise pressing questions: What is an achievable standard of resistance governance under wartime conditions? What do performance trends suggest about the long-term viability of resistance groups as post-conflict governing authorities? And, as the National Unity Government (NUG) undergoes internal reform amidst the emergence of federal units in Anyar region, what steps can be taken now to improve outcomes on the ground?

Photo by Pyae Sone Htun

Systems, Not Personalities, Are the Foundation of Good Governance

What we observe in today’s wartime governance does not necessarily reflect something fundamental and fixed about the individuals or groups involved. Rather, it reflects a core truth about governance: well-functioning systems are designed to constrain the worst impulses of leaders and reward pro-social behavior.

In Myanmar’s current context, the institutional architecture that typically enforces such constraints is either absent or severely weakened. Competitive elections, independent courts, robust civil society, free media, and legislative checks on executive power are all compromised. There are few feedback mechanisms and information flows that are needed for effective policymaking, and scarce resources are often legitimately channeled toward civilian protection and the war effort. Transparency is constrained by security risks and internet blackouts, and public feedback loops are minimal to nonexistent.

Individual capacity is also a challenge. Although many Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) have administered their territories for decades and Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) actors have added critical government experience, resistance governance in many areas, especially Anyar region, is entirely new. Without the conditions for building sustainable democratic institutions and processes, governance shortcomings are inevitable. These are less the result of willful neglect or malicious policy choices than the byproducts of wartime fragility. For governance to function, process must matter more than personalities. But Myanmar’s context makes that exceptionally difficult.

These conditions allow self-serving governance officials the opportunity to exploit communities to enrich themselves with impunity, while well-intentioned policymakers struggle to access the information needed for sound decision making. Telling the difference between the two is more difficult than ever.

These constraints don’t excuse failure. They tell us where reform must bite. The revolution’s foundational objective already points in the right direction.

Revolutionary Intent

System change after all, is exactly what the revolution is about. The idea that systems – not personalities – are the foundation of good governance is a motivating insight of the resistance. Changing who is in charge of the political system in Myanmar is fundamentally inadequate. It is the system itself that must be transformed – namely, the discriminatory governance apparatus and exclusionary political processes that consolidate power in the hands of old ultra-nationalist Bamar men with guns.

The dominant narratives about Myanmar’s conflict have long emphasized interpersonal mistrust and ethno-religious diversity as the core drivers of Myanmar’s conflict. While these factors matter, recent research indicates that the 75 years of conflict is more a result of military-designed governance and its exclusionary and exploitative political systems. Fortunately, the resistance has set its sights squarely on these factors.

The Promise of Reform

To meet the immense public need and advance the movement in the midst of a protracted war, it is critical that resistance governance improves. Recognizing the inadequacy of the current system, resistance stakeholders are in the middle of a complex process of restructuring governance systems and political processes.

One of the most important reform processes is taking place within the NUG. The NUG has faced criticism for weak leadership, inadequate inclusivity and coordination failures, but the most consistent target of critique is its Pa Thone Lone system of local administration, safety, and security. Pressure intensified after the “People’s Assembly” in April 2024, which brought those deficiencies into sharp focus. Most recently, Tayzar San, a key revolutionary figure who has built moral authority for courageous activism, wrote about the need for a more inclusive and effective union government body to lead the revolution.

The challenges of the Pa Thone Lone governance system and the NUG are well-known – even within the NUG. Survey NUG officials and you will hear many of the same complaints that you hear from outsiders: competition for local authority creates perverse incentives and undermines coordination; underperforming or corrupt officials are not held accountable; links between local government and the public are weak; law enforcement is inconsistent and dominated by unaccountable armed actors; and local administration is too often led by those with political connections not governance competencies. Internal NUG reviews and external research has repeatedly identified these same problems. It is the solutions – not so much the problems – that remain elusive.

The NUG’s present structure and processes are ill-suited to address these issues. Its consensus-based decision-making rules have made it slow to act on contentious but important issues, repeatedly defaulting to a status quo that is unacceptable to almost everyone. Its structure and mandate are not well-calibrated to its capacity and resources, with a meager budget spread across 17 ministries and 32 commissions. It is often simply too distant from the problem to identify the highly contextualized solutions that are needed.

The NUG also faces competing political pressures that constrain its ability to act effectively. It remains deeply tied to the National League for Democracy (NLD), the dominant national-level political force. To be seen as a credible union-level government and to sustain military progress, it must also consider the interests of powerful stakeholders such as the United League of Arakan and Kachin Independence Organization, which are wary of the NLD and suspicious of any strong, Bamar-dominated central authority. Balancing these divergent pressures has made decisive action exceedingly difficult.

Recognizing that its current systems and structures are ill-suited to solve these problems, the NUG has initiated an internal reform process. The nature of these reforms remains to be seen but will likely include efforts to pare down the ministry structure, devolve some powers to federal units and rethink sectoral strategies.

Concurrent to changes at the Union level, subnational federal units of Sagaing, Magwe, and Mandalay are, for the first time in Bamar-majority regions, establishing resistance governments. The emergence of these structures has not only created more coherence where there had been an array of discordant political units, but has created catalytic pressure on the NUG to undertake reforms and devolve governance authority.

Photo by Saw Wunna

Reforms That Deliver

The combination of internal NUG reforms and the devolution of power to coherent federal units comes with significant risks – weak federal units could become overwhelmed by local armed stakeholders, for example – but it may also reveal solutions to persistent governance problems in the following ways:

• Improved Government Performance: Devolving core governance functions from the NUG to federal units, guided by the principle of subsidiarity, could make governance more representative, responsive, and effective. Local governments could innovate and pilot policy interventions that are appropriate in their context but not in another. Federal units are likely better placed to deliver many services because they have localized information about needs and preferences and face more direct accountability from citizens. In turn, legitimacy will increasingly hinge on performance—resistance authorities that demonstrate competence and the ability to solve real governance problems will earn public trust and political credibility.

• More Efficient Use of Resources: Simplifying the NUG’s structure and devolving governance responsibilities could also help address resource constraints by more efficiently channeling existing resources and bringing new subnational stakeholders into the governance system. Delegating authority locally can distribute this burden and nurture the emergence of local expertise.

• Strengthened Cohesion: Devolution can also help strengthen intra-resistance cohesion and limit fragmentation risk. The consolidation of federal units creates new political space to resolve disputes between competing local resistance groups, and reduces the likelihood that conflict leads to violence. It also reduces the likelihood that conflict arises between the NUG and subnational stakeholders. The political negotiations between the Committee Representing the Sagaing Hluttaw and the Sagaing Forum, which were contentious but ultimately resulted in a constitutional agreement, offer a promising example of this principle.

• Improved Resilience: Decentralizing resistance governance can also yield a more resilient governance system since it disperses risk across government units such that one can continue to operate even if another becomes nonviable. It also can enable healthy asymmetric development of federal units.

Such reforms will also enable the NUG to demonstrate its commitment to the principle of federal democracy, which is, after all, the revolution’s core objective. The resistance faces a powerful commitment problem that undermines ERO buy-in to a national revolution. Even if EROs agree to the goal of dismantling the junta regime and establishing a federal democracy, many key stakeholders remain distant from the NUG because there is no credible guarantee it will honor its commitment to federalism. If the NUG takes concrete steps to decentralize power now, it would reduce concerns that the NUG would renege on its commitment to federalism after the war.

These reforms are not only about improving administration; they are about advancing the revolution. A movement that governs effectively—delivering services, resolving disputes, and maintaining accountability—will not only strengthen domestic legitimacy but also attract international support and sustain public mobilization. The junta’s strength lies in the absence of a viable political alternative. A credible, functioning alternative governance structure will erode the junta’s legitimacy and shift the balance of power over time.

Conclusion

Wartime governance in Myanmar is inevitably messy. But the lesson from the past four years is not about personalities; it is about systems. Under conditions of aerial terror, scarce resources, and broken feedback loops, even principled actors struggle. Accountability still matters, yet most failures reflect wartime fragility – not fate.

The way forward is to fix the system and the incentives that governance actors face. If the battlefield is chaotic, the institutions must be simple, disciplined, and biased toward performance: clear mandates, simple procedures, and real feedback loops. Streamline the NUG around what it can actually deliver. Devolve certain authorities to capable federal units in a phased and collaborative way. If done well, this will improve services, reduce fragmentation, stretch scarce resources, and spread risk across a more resilient governance architecture.

Visible devolution now is key to resolving the movement’s commitment problem and could strengthen trust between the NUG and its ERO partners. If the resistance can make governance work under fire, it will meet urgent public needs today and set the precedent for a federal democratic union of tomorrow.