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What made the American Revolution succeed wasn't unity or virtue. What made the American Revolution succeed wasn't unity or virtue. It was well-designed institutions that channeled self-interest toward the public good. Six lessons from the American founding for Burma's resistance — on coalition-building, wartime governance, and the long road to political order.

A peace process led by Myanmar's generals is a contradiction in terms. From 1963 to today, the military has treated negotiation not as a path to compromise but as a platform to project force and pressure adversaries into submission. Min Aung Hlaing's latest call for talks within 100 days of his inauguration revives a failed formula, dressed up once again as reform.

When Min Aung Hlaing handed Myanmar's top military post to intelligence chief Ye Win Oo, it caught many off guard. Ye Win Oo lacked the pedigree of past commanders but earned his position through unwavering loyalty and a willingness to serve as the regime's chief enforcer. His appointment reveals a regime prioritizing survival over reform, with sobering implications for Myanmar's political future.

Peacebuilding's persistent failures aren't implementation problems - they're structural. Drawing on over a decade of experience in Burma, this paper argues that the sector is organized like a broken market: chronic underinvestment, distorted demand, and weak evidence loops undermine even the best practitioners.

As Myanmar’s conflict drags on, the resistance faces a crucial test: can it build effective governance under fire? Billy Ford explores how on-going reforms within the NUG and emerging federal units could strengthen legitimacy, improve performance, and lay the groundwork for a future federal democracy.

Andrew Wells-Dang, Linh Nguyen and Brian Harding discuss the Thai-Cambodia border dispute and what it tells us about the strengths and weaknesses of conflict resolution capacity within Southeast Asia.