The Quiet Mediator: Malaysia's Peacebuilding Role and Its Implications for U.S. Policy

By: Brian Harding & Aizat Shamsuddin

October 23, 2026

I. Introduction

Malaysia, Southeast Asia’s sixth most populous country, punches above its weight in many ways. Economically, it is wired into the world’s most important supply chains and is on track to be a high-income country by the end of the decade according to the World Bank. At home, it is at peace, in 2026 ranking the 12th most peaceful nation according to a benchmark Global Peace Index.^[1] Stability at home and deep connections to the global economy—enhanced by extensive fraternal ties throughout the Muslim world—give it a cosmopolitan outlook, and its international engagement is ambitious for a country of 36 million people. While often debated among Malaysian thought leaders, many increasingly describe it as a “middle power.”

One area where Malaysia exerts significant influence in Southeast Asia in its immediate neighborhood is as a peacebuilder, a role that deserves more attention. For more than two decades, Putrajaya has helped manage conflicts through mediation, ceasefire monitoring and leader-level diplomacy. This report examines three flagship cases: the Bangsamoro peace process in the southern Philippines, the peace dialogue in Southern Thailand and Malaysia’s mediation of the 2025 Cambodia–Thailand border crisis. Together, they show Malaysia wielding influence that exceeds what its size and material power might suggest.

Quiet diplomacy explains why this contribution remains poorly understood internationally, including in Washington and other capitals. Malaysian officials conduct discussions behind closed doors and disclose little about facilitator arrangements. This discretion builds trust and preserves communication between governments and armed groups, but it also obscures the scale, institutional basis and lessons of Malaysia’s engagement. This report addresses that gap by examining how Malaysia uses access, proximity, cultural familiarity and long-term relationships to sustain peace processes. ^[2]

Malaysia’s peacebuilding model reflects its broader foreign policy, which is grounded in nonalignment and in longstanding commitments to regional stability, ASEAN cooperation and good relations with neighbors. Prime ministers have historically set the political direction, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advances it through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, all with deliberate attention to balance. No permanent institution leads Malaysia’s peacebuilding work but its initiatives sit within this framework. Specially appointed facilitators and small support offices manage individual processes with backing from the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council, Special Branch of the Royal Malaysia Police and technical partners. Specific initiatives are often ad hoc. This system provides flexibility and discretion but depends heavily on individual appointments—often military and intelligence—and sustained political support.

Malaysia’s policy of active nonalignment has enabled it to play a role as a trusted facilitator beyond its borders.^[3] It allows Putrajaya to engage governments, armed movements, ASEAN members, major powers and international partners flexibly and with credibility. Intensifying U.S.–China rivalry and the two powers’ economic and military influence increasingly test this position, but Malaysia adeptly managed these dynamics as ASEAN chair in 2025. In the southern Philippines and Southern Thailand, Malaysia benefits from geographic proximity, cultural and religious ties, sustained engagement and working relationships with governments and nonstate armed actors. This role is not purely altruistic. Violence in Southern Thailand and the southern Philippines spills into Malaysia through cross-border crime, kidnappings and displacement, giving Putrajaya a direct stake in containing these conflicts.

These cases trace Malaysia’s evolution from mediation and ceasefire management toward a broader agenda encompassing agreement implementation, governance, humanitarian protection, reintegration, institutional development and economic recovery. Malaysia possesses a latent middle-power peacebuilding capacity: practical, trusted and regionally grounded, but not yet fully institutionalized. Washington should understand, support and learn from this capacity without seeking to direct it.

II. The Bangsamoro Success Story

A facilitator with political and operational leverage

The Bangsamoro peace process provides the clearest evidence of Malaysia’s regional peacebuilding capacity. Malaysia combined trusted, discreet facilitation with practical ceasefire monitoring to help transform a decades-long conflict into one of the world’s most hopeful peace processes in decades. However, while the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) held its first parliamentary election on September 14, 2026, effectively completing the political elements of a two-track peace process, the transition remains incomplete. Malaysia must now shift to supporting political consolidation, economic development and the continuing work of the normalization track of the peace process.

International mediation in Mindanao predates Malaysia’s role. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) brokered the 1976 Tripoli Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and Indonesia, acting on behalf of the OIC, facilitated the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which had broken away from the MNLF, stayed outside both settlements. The Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the MILF began direct negotiations in 1997, but renewed fighting ended the talks in 2000. Malaysia became the third-party facilitator in 2001, hosted renewed negotiations and maintained discreet contact with both parties.^[4] Malaysian officials helped move the agenda beyond ceasefire arrangements toward rehabilitation, self-government and a comprehensive settlement.

Malaysia added operational leverage in 2004 by leading the International Monitoring Team.^[5] The team monitored the ceasefire and addressed violations before they escalated. By connecting political dialogue to credible monitoring, Malaysia reduced violence and kept negotiations moving.

Three factors made this approach effective. First, both parties accepted Malaysia as a credible facilitator. Geographic proximity, cultural and religious ties and established relationships gave Malaysian officials access that distant mediators lacked. Second, Malaysia sustained its involvement across leadership changes in Putrajaya and Manila. Third, Malaysia empowered senior facilitators with political authority and institutional backing. Tengku Dato’ Abdul Ghafar Tengku Mohamed, who led the final phase of negotiations, had served as deputy director-general of the Prime Minister’s Department’s Research Division and secretary to the National Security Council.^[6] This background gave him the access and authority to resolve obstacles quickly.

The process produced the 2012 Framework Agreement and the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. These agreements led to the Bangsamoro Organic Law in 2018 and the establishment of BARMM in 2019. Malaysia helped give the MILF a viable political alternative to armed struggle.

From peace agreement to political transition

The Bangsamoro peace process remains a genuine but unfinished success. Since 2019, BARMM has established a parliament, government ministries and foundational laws. Its leaders must now prove that autonomy can improve governance, public services, security and economic opportunity. Poverty, weak infrastructure, clan-based competition, private armed groups and uneven government capacity continue to undermine public confidence.

The first BARMM parliamentary election, which took place on September 14, 2026, presented a key test, which the parties passed.^[7] While there was election-related violence, including deadly shootings in Cotabato City, more than two million citizens went to the polls, a turnout of 84 percent, and the results were credible and accepted.^[8] The vote produced a hung parliament. The Bangsamoro Federalist Party (BFP), a breakaway composed largely of former MILF members and led by Manila-appointed interim Chief Minister Abdulraof Macacua, won 31 of 80 seats. The MILF’s United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) won 30, and the BARMM Grand Coalition of traditional provincial leaders won 15, leaving it to decide who becomes chief minister when parliament convenes on October 30. In early October, the BFP claimed a majority with the Grand Coalition’s support, a claim the UBJP disputed.^[9] The political task ahead - over both the near and medium term - will be how two clear factions within the MILF, as well as traditional local leaders, will negotiate power in the political arena. These new political divisions within the MILF will complicate remaining work required under the GPH–MILF peace agreement related to normalization—combatant decommissioning and reintegration, transitional justice, the disbandment of private armed groups and security-sector development. About 26,000 of the MILF’s 40,000 combatants have been decommissioned, but in July 2025 the MILF suspended the final phase, covering some 14,000 fighters, citing unmet socioeconomic commitments to those already decommissioned.^[10] The resumption of normalization activities in August 2026 restored momentum, but implementation will determine whether peace survives the political transition.^[11]

Malaysia’s return to the center

After years of only playing a minor role in the political transition through its enduring role as a facilitator, Malaysia saw its profile fall after implementation talks moved from Kuala Lumpur to the Philippines under the Duterte administration and after Manila declined to renew the mandate of the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team in 2022.^[12] From August to September 2026, Malaysia rapidly returned to the center of the dialogue. On August 4, 2026, Malaysian facilitator Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin facilitated a breakthrough meeting between the GPH and MILF peace implementing panels in Davao City, ending a five-month hiatus with a Declaration of Continuity of the Partnership that signaled continued commitment to the normalization process.^[13] Just after the BARMM parliamentary election, on September 25, 2026, Zulkifli facilitated a follow-up meeting in Kuala Lumpur, where the panels pledged to complete decommissioning and the rest of normalization, approved terms of reference for a roadmap to implement the remaining commitments, and extended the mandates of the joint ceasefire mechanisms to 2027 and 2028. MILF panel chairman Mohagher Iqbal called Malaysia’s facilitation “indispensable” and said he hoped Malaysia would stay until the process concludes with an Exit Agreement.^[14] Together, these signals point to Malaysia playing a central role in the future of the formal peace process, as the only honest broker with the credibility and long-term relationships across the full spectrum of actors within the MILF and GPH.

Given Malaysia’s credibility as a supporter of Bangsamoro development,^[15] Malaysia should look beyond its formal political role to support a sustainable peace, and help BARMM translate autonomy into tangible gains in governance and livelihoods.

Malaysia is well positioned to contribute to this next phase.^[16] Malaysia can share expertise in halal-industry development, Islamic finance and parliamentary administration. Institutions such as Tabung Haji offer lessons in pilgrimage-fund management, while the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) offers lessons in rural economic development. However, Bangsamoro institutions should adapt these models carefully because both Tabung Haji^[17] and FELDA^[18] have faced governance and corruption challenges. Malaysian agencies can also support the rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants and livelihood recovery for communities affected by the Marawi conflict.

Sabah could serve as an economic and people-to-people bridge. Kota Kinabalu and Sandakan could deepen trade, logistics, education and investment links with BARMM to encourage legitimate commerce. Such cooperation would nevertheless require careful diplomacy around longstanding political sensitivities, particularly the unresolved Philippine claim to Sabah.

Malaysia must also navigate the constitutional and political limits of Bangsamoro autonomy. Sulu remains outside BARMM following the 2024 Philippine Supreme Court ruling, despite its connections to the wider conflict.^[19] Manila—not BARMM—controls foreign affairs, defense and formal international security cooperation. Malaysia must therefore coordinate with the Philippine government while building economic and technical partnerships with BARMM.

The Bangsamoro peace process offers a clear lesson: mediation succeeds when the parties trust the facilitator, political leaders empower it and operational mechanisms reinforce dialogue. The international community can provide complementary technical and development assistance while supporting Malaysian leadership and local ownership.

III. Southern Thailand: Malaysia’s Indispensable but Constrained Role

Renewed violence exposes a stalled process

After the Bangsamoro peace process, Southern Thailand has been the second most important arena for Malaysian international peacebuilding. Unfortunately, a resurgence of violence in 2026 demonstrated that Malaysia has been far less successful in this case. A roadside bombing in Narathiwat injured two Malaysians in June,^[20] while a July attack^[21] killed five Thai security personnel and injured six civilians. On August 22, attackers carried out^[22] 51 coordinated bombings, arson attacks and acts of property damage across Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. The violence disrupted transport and prompted curfews and tighter security. Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned against nonessential travel,^[23] underscoring the conflict’s risks to Malaysian citizens, border communities, tourism and trade.

Political stagnation has contributed to the escalation. Changes in the Thai government, negotiating teams and military leadership have repeatedly interrupted dialogue. Internal divisions and waning confidence within parts of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), compounded by Thai security practices that deepen local resentment, such as arrests under martial-law powers and limited oversight of military operations, have further weakened incentives for restraint and de-escalation prospects.^[24]

Malaysia’s strengths have not overcome its constraints

While Bangkok has historically been reluctant to involve international actors in efforts to resolve the conflict, Malaysia has been a steady presence since 2013. It has hosted talks between Bangkok and the BRN, maintained contact through political interruptions, and helped secure temporary reductions in violence. Malaysian efforts helped produce the 2022 General Peace Principles^[25] and negotiations on a Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace,^[26] linking a monitored ceasefire to public consultation and political reform. By allowing exiled separatist figures to live in or transit Malaysia, Putrajaya has preserved access to actors Bangkok cannot easily reach. Meanwhile, Malaysian and Thai civil society exchanges have widened participation through civic education and helped communities organize around rights and justice.

However, these gains remain fragile. Malaysia’s reliance on individual facilitators means frequent personnel changes^[27] disrupt trust, institutional memory and follow-through. Small teams and limited resources further undermine continuity. Access to BRN political leaders does not guarantee influence over its armed wing, limiting Malaysia’s ability to translate dialogue into restraint on the ground. Perceptions of bias further constrain its role:^[28] Some Thai officials suspect Malaysia of favoring the BRN because it hosts separatist figures, while some BRN members view Malaysian security agencies as too closely aligned with Bangkok. Malaysia has managed to preserve the process, but still lacks the institutional continuity and operational leverage required to secure a lasting settlement.

Why the Bangsamoro model cannot transfer directly

The conflict’s current structure prevents Malaysia from replicating the Bangsamoro model. In the Philippines, the government negotiated the contours of a new political framework for the Bangsamoro with the MILF, creating a path from insurgency to autonomous governance within the Republic of the Philippines. In contrast, Thailand remains a centralized unitary state and treats the southern conflict primarily as an internal security issue. The BRN operates clandestinely and holds no recognized political authority comparable to the MILF in BARMM. When “the BRN” does participate in talks, it is not entirely clear who they represent. Earlier rounds from 2015 to 2019 ran through MARA Patani, an umbrella of several groups that included factions of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO); since 2020, Bangkok has negotiated mainly with the BRN. Neither format has settled who can speak for the armed movements, let alone for wider Malay-Muslim society. More fundamentally, the Thai state has yet to fully recognize Malay identity, Islam, Patani history and language rights as legitimate parts of Thailand’s national identity, limiting the scope for meaningful political accommodation.

Ultimately, the Thai military remains the decisive actor, given its monopoly of force and its outsized influence in national politics. Civilian leaders may authorize talks, but the military and security bureaucracy control operations, intelligence and implementation in the southern provinces. Martial law and emergency rule remain in force across much of Southern Thailand,^[29] giving security agencies broad powers over detention, movement and assembly. No agreement can endure unless these institutions accept political concessions and carry out their commitments. Malaysia must therefore secure support from both Thailand’s civilian government and its security establishment.

From message-carrying to facilitation

Current conditions in Thailand make a major breakthrough unlikely, but Malaysia can still take several practical steps to strengthen the peace process. Its relationships with Bangkok, Thai security officials and BRN representatives give it access no other external actor possesses. Putrajaya can use this access to clarify positions, identify common ground, resolve procedural obstacles and translate broad principles into reciprocal commitments.

One approach is to frame accommodation as an exchange within Thailand’s constitutional order. Bangkok would retain sovereignty and secure verifiable reductions in violence. Malay-Muslim communities would gain stronger cultural protections, legal safeguards and a greater voice in local governance. Initial measures could include expanding Malay-language education and public services, protecting religious and cultural practices and permitting locally led discussion of Patani history. In return, the BRN and any other participating groups should commit to protecting civilians, observing agreed pauses in violence and demonstrating control over their armed members.

Malaysia could also help the parties design a Thai-led justice and monitoring package. Thailand would retain criminal jurisdiction, while Malaysia could offer technical advice, convene independent specialists and help set transparent standards. A jointly authorized mechanism could verify ceasefire compliance, document incidents and establish a shared factual record without displacing Thai institutions.

Formalizing civil society participation offers another near-term opportunity. Women, youth, religious leaders, human-rights advocates and conflict-affected communities could contribute to consultations, monitoring and implementation. Their participation would help ensure that negotiations reflect local grievances and priorities while strengthening public confidence in the process.

Malaysia could also coordinate external support to avoid fragmented mediation efforts. Former Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla, who has also been engaged, could assist senior political outreach; the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the nongovernmental organization most involved in the peace process, could provide technical mediation and back-channel engagement. Bangkok and the BRN should agree on these complementary roles within one coherent process under Malaysian facilitation.

None of these steps requires an immediate comprehensive settlement. However, they require greater Malaysian capacity and sustained engagement. Interviews conducted for this report repeatedly identified inadequate resourcing as a core weakness. Sustained facilitation needs a committed facilitator, adequate staff, civilian expertise and a clear mandate.

IV. Cambodia–Thailand and the ASEAN Chair Dimension

A test of ASEAN leadership

In many ways, geography and religious ties have made Malaysia’s engagement in the first two cases inevitable. In 2025 circumstances forced Malaysia to test its capacity to be a mediator slightly further afield, when as ASEAN chair, the Cambodia–Thailand border clashes erupted. Malaysia used the chair’s convening power and leader-level diplomacy, and again demonstrated its ability to be a trusted mediator among neighbors.

The intervention showed how an assertive ASEAN chair can open diplomatic space while preserving ASEAN’s principles of noninterference. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim contacted both governments and brought Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thai Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai to Putrajaya. Malaysia presented the talks as an ASEAN-led effort,^[30] preserving regional ownership and avoiding an imposed settlement.

Quiet diplomacy backed by external leverage

Malaysia combined discreet regional diplomacy with channeling U.S. and Chinese pressure. President Donald Trump spoke with both leaders and used U.S. trade relations as leverage to press for a ceasefire.^[31] The United States co-organized the Putrajaya meeting, while China participated actively. Malaysia then converted this external pressure into an ASEAN-based process acceptable to both parties, while maintaining ASEAN’s central role and regional ownership of the process.

The meeting secured an immediate and unconditional ceasefire,^[32] although it later broke down amid mutual accusations of violations. It also restored direct communication among political and defense leaders, initiated meetings between regional commanders and activated the General Border Committee process. Malaysia offered to coordinate an ASEAN observer team and sent its armed forces chief to engage both sides. This sequence connected political talks to military de-escalation and verification.

What the intervention revealed

Malaysia succeeded because both parties accepted its role and because it had credibility with the two outside powers seeking to be involved. Its ASEAN chairmanship, active nonalignment, access to regional leaders and avoidance of public grandstanding allowed Malaysia to exercise influence by invitation. As former Malaysian ambassador Ilango Karuppannan observed,^[33] Malaysia became “the region’s enabler of diplomacy, not merely as a proxy.” Its credibility with both Washington and Beijing helped translate external pressure into practical effect.

The intervention also exposed clear limits to Malaysia’s influence. The ceasefire stopped the immediate escalation but did not resolve the underlying border dispute. Nationalism and domestic politics constrained both governments, while ASEAN lacked enforcement power. The process relied heavily on Prime Minister Anwar’s personal diplomacy, raising questions about institutional continuity and the extent of ownership by Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ASEAN institutions. Although the October Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration^[34] formalized the ASEAN Observer Team, renewed fighting shortly after in December^[35] exposed the arrangement’s fragility.

Malaysia can de-escalate regional conflicts when ASEAN members accept its role and major powers support its leadership, but lasting peace still requires stronger institutional mechanisms, effective monitoring and the political will of all parties to address underlying disputes.

V. How Malaysia Does Peacebuilding: Institutions and Limits

A proven but person-dependent model

Malaysia has no permanent institution for peacebuilding. The prime minister sets the political direction, while ad hoc teams work through discreet diplomatic and security channels. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs mainly provides support. This model enables speed and confidentiality but relies heavily on senior officials and personal networks. Placing facilitation close to the Prime Minister’s Office and the National Security Council keeps it discreet and politically backed, so the limited role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not in itself a weakness. The test is whether these offices have the management systems, succession arrangements and interagency coordination to preserve continuity.

All three cases follow this pattern. In the Bangsamoro peace process, Datuk Othman Abd Razak and Tengku Dato’ Abdul Ghafar Tengku Mohamed^[36] led facilitation teams linked to the Prime Minister’s Department’s Research Division, Malaysia’s external intelligence arm. In the Southern Thailand conflict, Putrajaya has relied on senior security officials: Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, a former director-general of the Research Division; Abdul Rahim Mohd Noor, a former inspector-general of police; Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, a former chief of defence forces; and Rabin Basir,^[37] a former director-general of the National Security Council. Zulkifli now also serves as Malaysia’s facilitator in the Bangsamoro process, which shows how much both processes depend on a small pool of senior officials.^[38] During the Cambodia–Thailand crisis, Anwar Ibrahim acted as both prime minister and ASEAN chair. In none of these cases did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lead.

This arrangement also reflects Malaysia’s comprehensive view of security, which has long treated development and social stability as part of national security. Peacebuilding therefore draws on several parts of government at once: the Prime Minister’s Office and the National Security Council set direction, the Special Branch of the Royal Malaysia Police maintains contact with armed movements and exiled figures, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages relations with governments, and the armed forces and border agencies handle security on the frontier. How these bodies coordinate is rarely visible from outside, which makes the system difficult to assess.

These cases show that high-level leadership can open political space and accelerate action. The weakness lies below that level: Malaysia lacks a standing system to preserve knowledge, prepare facilitators, plan succession, coordinate agencies and sustain implementation.

Why the model produces uneven results

Three factors determine whether political access produces lasting results: a clear mandate, operational support and continuity. The Bangsamoro experience combined all three. Its facilitators maintained sustained contact with both parties and connected negotiations to ceasefire monitoring and implementation mechanisms.

Southern Thailand shows what happens when these conditions weaken. Facilitators operate with smaller teams, fewer civilian specialists and no comparable monitoring mechanism. Leadership changes disrupt relationships and institutional memory. Facilitation can therefore become message-carrying between Bangkok and the BRN rather than active problem-solving.

Cambodia–Thailand revealed a different constraint. Malaysia mobilized leader-level authority quickly, but its intervention depended on the ASEAN chairmanship and Anwar’s personal diplomacy. This approach helped de-escalate the crisis but could not ensure sustained ceasefire implementation.

These differences expose a broader institutional imbalance. Security and intelligence agencies give facilitators access to armed groups, confidential channels and knowledge of immediate threats. Yet an overly security-led process can narrow diplomatic continuity, humanitarian expertise, public communication and community participation. Our experience conducting research for this report underscored this dynamic: those most closely involved were hesitant to speak with nongovernmental analysts due to their conservative bureaucratic cultures. Limited funding compounds these gaps. Malaysia allocated about RM1.20 billion to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 2026 federal budget—less than 0.3 percent of federal appropriations—with no publicly identified peacebuilding budget line.^[39] Because facilitation runs mainly through the Prime Minister’s Office and security agencies, the allocation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs understates what Malaysia spends. But since none of this spending is reported as peacebuilding, its true scale is difficult to assess.

Prospects for institutionalization

Malaysia should close these gaps through a small peacebuilding secretariat, not a large new agency. The secretariat should perform four functions: preserve records and lessons; maintain a trained roster of facilitators and specialists; coordinate agencies and funding; and support monitoring and agreement implementation.

It should build on the Malaysian Peacekeeping Centre and the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism while connecting the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council, security agencies, embassies, research institutions and civil society. Civilian participation must form part of this structure. Diplomats, academics, humanitarian practitioners, human-rights advocates, women’s organizations and representatives of conflict-affected communities should serve as facilitators, advisers and monitors. A permanent advisory group could analyze conflicts, organize consultations, assess humanitarian and human-rights concerns and guide public communication. These roles would complement the access and security knowledge of military and intelligence officials.

Training should cover mediation, monitoring, governance, transitional justice, reintegration, economic development and strategic communications. This breadth reflects Malaysia’s comprehensive approach to security, which links stability to development. Malaysia should also practice active impartiality: support neither side, protect the process and press all parties to honor their commitments. Clearer public reporting would strengthen accountability, domestic support and regional learning. No other country in Southeast Asia is better positioned to house a regional peacebuilding hub. The ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation in Jakarta already exists, but as an intergovernmental body it works by consensus and within ASEAN’s norm of noninterference, which limits its role in members’ internal conflicts. A Malaysian hub could complement it by drawing on live facilitation experience, training practitioners from government and civil society, and engaging conflict parties where governments consent.

While international practitioners would benefit from greater engagement with Malaysian practitioners, it is unlikely Malaysia will be involved in peacebuilding efforts far from its borders. A recurring perspective in our interviews was that there is much for the world to learn from Malaysia’s experiences, but that Malaysia is not seeking to play a leading role beyond its immediate neighborhood, even including in Myanmar or West Papua. At least not yet.

Several factors explain this restraint. Malaysia’s advantages of proximity, cultural ties and long relationships with conflict parties weaken farther from its borders, and its thin institutional base limits how many processes it can sustain. Malaysia also tends to engage where it has a recognized platform, as ASEAN chair or as an invited facilitator, rather than to drive its own agenda, and where a conflict touches its own interests, from border security to refugee flows. In West Papua, any role would cut across Indonesia’s sovereignty, which Jakarta guards closely. In Myanmar, Malaysia has engaged mainly through ASEAN channels, and its posture is shifting toward normalization: in October 2026, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim pledged to do “whatever possible” to bring Myanmar back into ASEAN while hosting Min Aung Hlaing on his first visit since the 2021 coup, nine days after Malaysia began returning Myanmar nationals by sea, returns the UN refugee agency could not verify as voluntary.^[40]

VI. Implications for U.S. Policy^[41]

Build on a stronger partnership

U.S.–Malaysia relations have gained momentum since October 2025, when the two governments elevated ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership^[42] and expanded cooperation on maritime security, critical minerals, trade and investment. Beyond bilateral priorities, Malaysia’s role as an influential middle power in maintaining Southeast Asia’s political, social and economic stability is increasingly valuable to U.S. strategic interests. The Cambodia–Thailand crisis showed how the United States and Malaysia can work together on this shared objective. Malaysia contributed regional legitimacy, access and ASEAN leadership; the United States added diplomatic and economic leverage. Their co-organization of the July 2025 Putrajaya meeting helped secure an immediate ceasefire.^[43]

Important differences remain. Malaysia practices active nonalignment,^[44] maintains close relations with China and often diverges from Washington on Palestine and other international issues. Trade tensions, including a 19 percent U.S. tariff^[45] on most Malaysian imports, add friction. Yet Malaysia’s strategic independence is precisely what makes it a valuable regional partner. Its ability to engage across geopolitical divides, maintain the confidence of regional actors and facilitate dialogues gives it diplomatic influence that Washington cannot always exercise directly. Washington should therefore approach Malaysia as an autonomous middle power whose diplomatic influence can complement U.S. interests, rather than seeking to draw it into a U.S.-led bloc.

Support Malaysian leadership

Malaysia is Southeast Asia’s strongest candidate to host a regional peacebuilding hub, which would lend itself to a bilateral or multilateral cooperative initiative. Malaysia combines practical experience, geographic and cultural proximity, access to governments and armed groups, and credibility within ASEAN and the Muslim world. Yet limited funding and ad hoc institutions have prevented Malaysia from systematically translating this experience into sustained institutional and regional capacity building. Strengthening Malaysia’s peacebuilding capabilities would serve both Malaysia and U.S. interests in more effective regional responses to conflict while reducing dependence on direct major-power intervention.

Washington could work with partners such as Japan, which has backed the Bangsamoro process through the International Monitoring Team and development assistance, to provide multiyear funding and technical assistance for a Malaysian-led network anchored by a small coordinating office. The network could connect government agencies, universities, think tanks and civil society organizations. It could train officials and civilian facilitators, maintain a roster of specialists, document lessons, and support research and professional exchanges.

The hub could draw practical lessons from ceasefire monitoring in Mindanao, facilitation in Southern Thailand, combatant reintegration, transitional governance, community reconciliation, halal and Islamic-finance development, and multilingual communication. A partnership with the United States or others could also support early warning, humanitarian safeguards, community consultation, agreement implementation and small grants for local civil society.

Regardless of the exact parameters, the initiative should remain Malaysian-led, with its mandate and priorities determined by Malaysian institutions and regional needs. Preserving Malaysia’s independence would be essential to maintaining the trust and political access that underpin its effectiveness.

Engage consequential actors quietly

Malaysian and U.S. peacebuilding strengths are complementary, but their roles need not be equally visible. Governments, militaries and armed movements may resist visible U.S. involvement and be more willing to engage with Malaysia, but U.S. involvement can still be decisive, as seen in the Cambodia–Thailand case. If invited, Washington should work through trusted Malaysian channels. For example, in Southern Thailand, if needed, Washington could support Malaysia’s coordination with various nongovernmental actors; the United States could also potentially play a constructive role with Bangkok, but any support for the peace process should be coordinated closely with Putrajaya to avoid competing channels that could complicate negotiations.

Washington should also bring Malaysian officials, facilitators, researchers and civil society experts into international peacebuilding forums, professional exchanges and policy dialogues. This would broaden international understanding of Southeast Asian approaches and allow other peace processes to draw on Malaysia’s experience. The most effective U.S. role is as an enabler: providing resources, technical support and international access while leaving Malaysia in the driver’s seat.

VII. Conclusion

Malaysia shows how a middle power can shape regional peace through trust, political access and legitimacy rather than coercion. The Bangsamoro peace process succeeded because Malaysia paired trusted facilitation with political backing, ceasefire monitoring and implementation mechanisms. Southern Thailand shows the limits of access without a strong mandate, continuity or civilian expertise, and influence over armed actors—yet any future successful process will almost certainly include Malaysia. Cambodia–Thailand demonstrates how regional legitimacy can harness external leverage to secure rapid de-escalation. Together, these cases show that institutions must sustain quiet diplomacy.

Malaysia should build on its existing peacebuilding architecture and turn its ad hoc practice into durable capacity. It does not need a large bureaucracy. It needs a small secretariat, predictable funding, trained facilitators, preserved knowledge and practical tools for monitoring, humanitarian protection, reintegration and agreement implementation. This framework should connect the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, security agencies, civilian specialists, researchers and civil society.

The lesson on both the possibilities and constraints of middle-power peacebuilding extends beyond Malaysia. Middle powers can enter peace processes that major powers cannot easily navigate, but proximity alone cannot deliver lasting peace. They must combine active impartiality, inclusive institutions and operational support.

The United States should strengthen this model by raising Malaysia’s profile in the international peacebuilding field. This would be a boon to U.S.–Malaysia relations, and be a practical partnership for peace and stability beyond Malaysia’s borders. As competition with China shapes Southeast Asia, backing a trusted regional mediator is also a low-cost way for Washington to reduce instability that rivals could exploit, without asking regional states to choose sides. A Malaysian-led hub could turn national experience into regional knowledge and offer an adaptable model for Southeast Asia and beyond.

---

About the Authors

Brian Harding is a senior research fellow with the Southeast Asia Peace Institute.​ From 2020 to 2025, Brian helped lead a major expansion of programming in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), including the development of new country programs and offices in the Philippines and Papua New Guinea. In the Philippines. ​Before joining USIP, Brian was deputy director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and director for Asia policy at the Center for American Progress. From 2009 to 2013, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as country director for Asian and Pacific security affairs, where he managed defense relations with major U.S. partners in Southeast Asia and Oceania. Brian concurrently serves as a senior fellow (non-resident) at Sasakawa USA and as a senior advisor with the U.S.-Philippines Society.

Aizat Shamsuddin is the executive director of the Initiative to Promote Tolerance and Prevent Violence (INITIATE.MY). For the past decade, he has been a dedicated analyst and practitioner in traditional and nontraditional security, focusing on crime and ideology. His expertise spans hate and violent extremism in both real and digital spaces, intergroup conflicts. Prior to founding INITIATE.MY, he was a program coordinator at the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Bangkok office focused on transnational organized crime and conflict in Southeast Asia. Aizat has played a key role in organizing Track 1.5 dialogues between regional law enforcement agencies and civil society, developing niche online courses and databases, writing policy reports, and contributing to policy discussions. In doing these, his priorities are to minimize security threats and promote measures for resilience.

The authors are grateful for editing support from Suyin Chia (Research Director at INITIATE.MY) and Izzah Ibrahim (Analyst, Institute of Strategic & International Studies Malaysia)

---

Endnotes:

^[1]Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2026. https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Global-Peace-Index-2026-Report.pdf

 ^[2] The project draws on 14 interviews conducted in August 2026, with Malaysian, Thai and Philippine government officials, diplomats, academics, journalists and civil society representatives. Funding was provided by the Peacebuilder Grant Fund, established in Washington, DC in 2026 by Pragmatic Panic.

 ^[3] Anwar Ibrahim. (2025, May 31). Holding our ground: Southeast Asia in a fractured world [Speech]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/post/holding-our-ground-southeast-asia-in-a-fractured-world-speech-by-the-honourable-dato-seri-anwar-ibrahim-prime-minister-of-malaysia-at-the-shangri-la-d 

^[4] Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity. (2017, January 16). Introduction. https://peace.gov.ph/milf/introduction/ 

^[5] Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity. (2020, March 13). IMT, ceasefire mechanisms keep Bangsamoro peace process on track. https://peace.gov.ph/2020/03/imt-ceasefire-mechanisms-keep-bangsamoro-peace-process-on-track/ 

^[6] Bernama. (2016, September 3). Tengku Abdul Ghafar who helped broker Manila-MILF peace deal dies at age 67. Malay Mail. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2016/09/03/tengku-abdul-ghafar-who-helped-broker-manila-milf-peace-deal-dies-at-age-67/1197873 

^[7] Lo, B. (2026, September 15). Election in Philippines’ Bangsamoro region ends in hung parliament. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/15/election-in-philippines-bangsamoro-region-ends-in-hung-parliament

 ^[8] GMA News Online. (2026, September 16). Comelec: 84.34% voter turnout in first BARMM parliamentary polls. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/regions/1002557/comelec-84-34-voter-turnout-in-first-barmm-parliamentary-polls/story/

^[9] Rappler. (2026, September 17). Party leaders to negotiate coalition in BARMM Parliament. https://www.rappler.com/philippines/elections/coalition-talks-unavoidable-barmm-hung-parliament/; Luwaran. (2026, October 3). Iqbal calls BFP’s 46-seat claim “optics,” pushes rainbow coalition. https://luwaran.com/news/article/3319/iqbal-calls-bfps-46-seat-claim-optics-pushes-rainbow-coalition; Daily Tribune. (2026, October 14). Macacua vows inclusive BARMM governance as 46 MPs sign coalition accord. https://tribune.net.ph/2026/10/14/macacua-vows-inclusive-barmm-governance-as-46-mps-sign-coalition-accord

^[10] MindaNews. (2025, July 27). MILF stops decommissioning of remaining 14,000 combatants. https://mindanews.com/top-stories/2025/07/milf-stops-decommissioning-of-remaining-14000-combatants/

^[11] Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity. (2026, August 8). GPH, MILF Peace Implementing Panels reconvene, announce resumption of normalization activities. https://peace.gov.ph/2026/08/gph-milf-peace-implementing-panels-reconvene-announce-resumption-of-normalization-activities/ 

^[12] BenarNews. (2022, July 15). Foreign peace monitors depart southern Philippines after nearly 2 decades. https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/philippine/foreign-peace-monitors-depart-southern-philippines-after-nearly-2-decades-07152022124503.html; Bencito, J. P. (2017, March 22). Venue of peace talks to return to PH shores. The Standard, via Institute for Autonomy and Governance. https://iag.org.ph/news/284-venue-of-peace-talks-to-return-to-ph-shores

^[13] Bacongco, K. (2026, August 5). Gov’t, MILF reaffirm implementation of remaining shared CAB commitments. Manila Bulletin. https://mb.com.ph/2026/08/05/govt-milf-reaffirm-implementation-of-remaining-shared-cab-commitments

^[14] MindaNews. (2026, September 25). In KL meet, GPH, MILF vow to complete decommissioning and other aspects of normalization in the Bangsamoro. https://mindanews.com/peace-process/2026/09/in-kl-meet-gph-milf-vow-to-complete-decommissioning-and-other-aspects-of-normalization-in-the-bangsamoro/; Malay Mail. (2026, September 26). Moro Islamic Liberation Front says Malaysia’s role indispensable to Philippines’ Bangsamoro peace process. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2026/09/26/moro-islamic-liberation-front-says-malaysias-role-indispensable-to-philippines-bangsamoro-peace-process/236550

^[15] Dureza, J. G. (2016, August 13). Press statement on the launching of the implementing phase of the Bangsamoro peace accords. Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity. https://peace.gov.ph/2016/08/press-statement-of-secretary-jesus-g-dureza-on-the-launching-of-the-implementing-phase-of-the-bangsamoro-peace-accords/

^[16] Shamsuddin, A., & Harding, B. (2026, October 14). Opinion: Malaysia’s work for Bangsamoro is still not done. The Edge Malaysia. https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/821772

^[17] Transparency International Malaysia. (2026, July 30). Transparency International Malaysia welcomes release of Tabung Haji RCI report, declares: ‘Transparency delayed is accountability denied’. https://www.transparency.org.my/pages/news-and-events/press-releases/transparency-international-malaysia-welcomes-release-of-tabung-haji-rci-report-declares-transparency-delayed-is-accountability-denied

 ^[18] Satar, A. (2017, December 10). Press statement: 2017—‘FELDA year’. Transparency International Malaysia. https://transparency.org.my/pages/news-and-events/press-releases/press-statement-2017-felda-year

 ^[19] Supreme Court of the Philippines. (2024, September 9). SC upholds validity of Bangsamoro Organic Law; declares Sulu not part of Bangsamoro Region. https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-upholds-validity-of-bangsamoro-organic-law-declares-sulu-not-part-of-bangsamoro-region/

^[20] Thai PBS World. (2026, June 29). Two Malaysians injured in Narathiwat roadside bomb blast. https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/two-malaysians-injured-in-narathiwat-roadside-bomb-blast/61847

 ^[21] Reuters. (2026, July 23). Five security personnel killed in attack in Thailand’s south. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/five-security-personnel-killed-attack-thailands-south-2026-07-23/

 ^[22] Associated Press. (2026, August 23). Thai prime minister meets security chiefs after coordinated attacks in 3 southern provinces. https://apnews.com/article/863364191d84b10bd82ea9b8e47e62ca

 ^[23] Malay Mail. (2026, August 23). After southern Thailand blasts, Wisma Putra tells Malaysians to think twice before crossing border. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2026/08/23/after-southern-thailand-blasts-wisma-putra-tells-malaysians-to-think-twice-before-crossing-border/232412

 ^[24] Reuters. (2026, August 19). Thailand seeks new path to end deadly southern insurgency, negotiator says. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-seeks-new-path-end-deadly-southern-insurgency-negotiator-says-2026-08-19/ 

^[25] Peace Dialogue Panel of the Royal Thai Government & Barisan Revolusi Nasional. (2022, March 31). General principles of the peace dialogue process. PA-X Peace Agreements Database, University of Edinburgh. https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/2472/

 ^[26] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand. (2024, December 16). Joint press statement of 7th annual consultation between Prime Minister of Malaysia and Prime Minister of Thailand. https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/joint-press-statement-pm-malaysia-thailand

 ^[27] Azmi, H. (2024, July 10). New Malaysian mediator sparks hope for ‘more effective’ Thai peace talks with separatists. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3269937/new-malaysian-mediator-sparks-hope-more-effective-thai-peace-talks-separatists

^[28] International Crisis Group. (n.d.). Sustaining momentum in Southern Thailand’s peace dialogue. https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/asia-pacific/thailand/b172-sustaining-momentum-southern-thailands-peace-dialogue 

^[29] Thai PBS World. (n.d.). Government urged to end military-led approach in Deep South. https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/government-urged-to-end-militaryled-approach-in-deep-south/61155

^[30] Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2025, July 31). ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ statement on the outcome of the special meeting hosted by Malaysia to address the current situation between Cambodia and Thailand. https://asean.org/asean-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-outcome-of-the-special-meeting-hosted-by-malaysia-to-address-the-current-situation-between-cambodia-and-thailand/

 ^[31] Reuters. (2025, July 27). Trump says Thailand, Cambodia agree to hold immediate ceasefire talks. The Kathmandu Post. https://kathmandupost.com/world/2025/07/27/trump-says-thailand-cambodia-agree-to-hold-immediate-ceasefire-talks

 ^[32] Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia. (2025, July 28). Joint press conference on the special meeting hosted by Malaysia to address the current situation between Cambodia and Thailand. https://www.pmo.gov.my/en/speeches-en/joint-press-conference-on-the-special-meeting-hosted-by-malaysia-to-address-the-current-situation-between-cambodia-and-thailand/

 ^[33] Karuppannan, I. (2025, August 5). Diplomacy without drama: Malaysia’s role in the Cambodia-Thailand conflict. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/diplomacy-without-drama-malaysias-role-in-the-cambodia-thailand-conflict/

 ^[34] The White House. (2025, October 26). Joint declaration by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand on the outcomes of their meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/joint-declaration-by-the-prime-minister-of-the-kingdom-of-cambodia-and-the-prime-minister-of-the-kingdom-of-thailand-on-the-outcomes-of-their-meeting-in-kuala-lumpur-malaysia/

 ^[35] Wongcha-um, P. (2025, December 27). Thailand and Cambodia halt fierce border conflict with second ceasefire. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-cambodia-sign-ceasefire-agreement-cambodian-defence-ministry-says-2025-12-27/ 

^[36] Arguillas, C. O. (2011, April 27). GPH-MILF talks has new facilitator. MindaNews. https://mindanews.com/top-stories/2011/04/gph-milf-talks-has-new-facilitator/

 ^[37] BenarNews. (2024, July 5). Malaysia appoints former national security chief to broker Thai peace talks. https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/peace-negotiator-07052024115241.html

 ^[38] Malay Mail. (2026, September 26). Moro Islamic Liberation Front says Malaysia’s role indispensable to Philippines’ Bangsamoro peace process. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2026/09/26/moro-islamic-liberation-front-says-malaysias-role-indispensable-to-philippines-bangsamoro-peace-process/236550

^[39] Bernama. (2025, October 10). Budget 2026: A positive boost for Wisma Putra in strengthening foreign policy. https://bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2477332

 ^[40] Latiff, R. (2026, October 8). Malaysia to work towards Myanmar’s full reintegration into ASEAN, PM says. Reuters, via ThePrint. https://theprint.in/world/malaysia-to-work-towards-myanmars-full-reintegration-into-asean-pm-says/3065125/; Shamsuddin, A. (2026, October 16). Malaysia’s welcome for Min Aung Hlaing undermines its stand on justice. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/10/16/malaysias-welcome-for-min-aung-hlaing-undermines-its-stand-on-justice

^[41] This report focuses on recommendations for U.S. policy, but acknowledges that many recommendations would be transferable to other interested countries.

^[42] The White House. (2025, October 26). Fact sheet: President Donald J. Trump secures peace and prosperity in Malaysia. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/10/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-peace-and-prosperity-in-malaysia/

 ^[43] Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2025, July 31). ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ statement on the outcome of the special meeting hosted by Malaysia to address the current situation between Cambodia and Thailand. https://asean.org/asean-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-outcome-of-the-special-meeting-hosted-by-malaysia-to-address-the-current-situation-between-cambodia-and-thailand/

 ^[44] Anwar Ibrahim. (2025, June 19). Keynote address at the 38th Asia-Pacific Roundtable [Speech]. Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia. https://www.pmo.gov.my/en/speeches-en/keynote-address-by-yab-prime-minister-at-the-38th-asia-pacific-roundtable-apr/

 ^[45] Office of the United States Trade Representative. (2025, October 26). Fact sheet: The United States and Malaysia reach an agreement on reciprocal trade. https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2025/october/fact-sheet-united-states-and-malaysia-reach-agreement-reciprocal-trade